U.S. Multinational Direct Investment: Regulation by Member States of the European Community by Stuhldreher, Justin M.
Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 53 | Issue 4 Article 6
4-1-1978
U.S. Multinational Direct Investment: Regulation
by Member States of the European Community
Justin M. Stuhldreher
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Justin M. Stuhldreher, U.S. Multinational Direct Investment: Regulation by Member States of the European Community, 53 Notre Dame L.
Rev. 799 (1978).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol53/iss4/6
NOTES
U.S. MULTINATIONAL DIRECT INVESTMENT: REGULATION
BY MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
I. Introduction
Direct investment, as opposed to portfolio investment,' involves investment
by U.S. companies in overseas branches, subsidiaries, and associates, as well as
acquisition of controlling interests in existing foreign companies.2 This method
of foreign investment includes both the transfer of money capital by the U.S.
company to the foreign market, and the transfer of management and technical
guidance, dissemination of technical knowledge through the establishment of
foreign research and development departments, and the dissemination of pro-
duction and marketing skills. The principal advantage of direct investment to
the U.S. company is that it enables the U.S. company to maintain substantial
control over the management of its foreign investment. The major economic
decisions regarding the development of the investment opportunity are made
by decision-makers residing outside of the host country.
This aspect of foreign direct investment has caused European host coun-
tries, particularly France, to rebel against the growing input of foreign direct
investment. The current prevalence of direct investment by U.S. companies
in Western Europe has led countries such as France to warn other European
countries that their economies are subject to the control of outsiders. This warn-
ing has not, however, led other European countries to prevent U. S. companies
from continuing their direct investment.
The U. S. based multinational companies have steadily increased their
direct investment in Western Europe since 1950.' The major factor contributing
to this increase was the formation of the European Economic Community
(E.E.C.). The Treaty of Rome which created the E.E.C. was signed in 1957
and ratified in 1958 by West Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium,
and Luxembourg. The formation of the E.E.C. created a continent-size market,
with demographic and economic characteristics similar to that of the United
States, in which U. S. multinational corporations (MNCs) could establish and
operate efficiently and effectively.
The announced purpose of the Treaty of Rome was to create a European
Economic Community through:
(a) the progressive reduction and removal of all fiscal and physical restric-
tions on the free movement of goods, capital, and persons among member
states,
(b) harmonization of their economic policies, and
1 Portfolio investment is the acquisition of stocks and other securities of a business concern
which is located in a foreign country. It does not include any accompanying control over or
participation in the management of a foreign concern.
2 P. COLEBROOK, GOING INTERNATIONAL 4 (1972).
3 The U.S. Department of Commerce's Survey of Current Business (1974) shows that in
1950 U.S. direct investment in Western Europe was $1.7 billion, in 1960 it was $6.7 billion, and
by 1974 it had grown to $44.5 billion.
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(c) the consolidation of their separate external tariffs into one uniform
tariff system applicable to all imports into the E.E.C. from the rest of the
world.'
These three goals have encouraged U. S. direct investment in the E.E.C. by
disadvantaging American industrials attempting to penetrate the European
Common Market as "outsiders" 5 via exports from their plants in the U. S. and
other non-Common Market countries. First, the member states of the E.E.C.
developed a Common External Tariff (C.E.T.). The C.E.T. imposes tariffs
against products being imported into the E.E.C. from non-member countries;
these tariffs are not applicable to the same products if they are produced in one
of the E.E.C. member states.' Goods manufactured by a company in the U. S.
formerly could compete with Italian goods in a French market, for example,
because both goods were subject to the same French tariff. Under the C.E.T.,
however, the American product is subject to the Common External Tariff,
whereas the Italian product will enter the French market tariff-free. Con-
sequently, goods manufactured in the U. S. are now at a competitive disadvan-
tage with goods produced within the E.E.C. The only way a U. S. company is
able to overcome this tariff discrimination is to establish a production operation
in an E.E.C. member state. Because the product will now be produced within
the E.E.C., it will escape the C.E.T.
Second, the E.E.C. treaty provisions concerning the elimination of all re-
strictions on the free movement of goods, persons, and capital among member
states apply to all companies and persons duly established within a member
state pursuant to Article 58 of the E.E.C. Treaty, regardless of their nationality
or the nationality of their owners.' Due to the fact that capital markets in the
E.E.C. member states have been substantially broadened because of the removal
of restrictions imposed on the shifting of capital from one member state to an-
other, U. S. subsidiaries now have a substantially broadened pool of capital
from which they are able to draw the funds necessary to finance their operations.8
Further, the E.E.C. Treaty permits companies, including U. S. subsidiaries,
established in one member state to establish operations within the territory of
any other member state.9 This presents an unusual advantage to an American
company seeking to establish a subsidiary in one of the member states.
A further advantage to an American company occurs due to the failure of
the E.E.C. to achieve its third goal, the harmonization of the member states'
economic policies, as this has enabled American companies to use the divergent
economic and commercial policies of the different member states to gain pref-
4 In 1962, the Member States adopted a Common External Tariff (CET) to be applied
by all Member States to all imports coming from areas outside of the E.E.C. Moreover, the
Member States achieved a system of tariff-free internal trade in 1968. Harmonization of the
economic policies of the Member States, as provided for by Articles 110-113 of the Treaty of
Rome, however, has been predictably slow.
5 The term "outsiders" refers to a company which does not have a production unit or
other direct investment established in one of the Member States of the E.E.C.
6 L. KRAUSE, EUROPEAN ECONOMC INTEGRATION AND THE U.S. 120 (1968).
7 See Treaty of Rome, arts. 9, 48, 67.
8 Committee for Economic Development (C.E.D.), The United States and the European
Community: Policies for a Changing World Economy 14 (1971).
9 KRAUSE, supra note 6, at 120.
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erential positions within the E.E.C. This note will outline the present regulations
in France and the United Kingdom as examples of divergent policies within
the E.E.C.
These three factors have encouraged American MNC's to establish direct
investments within the European Common Market. The usual procedure
followed by a U. S. MNC is to apply for permission for the proposed direct
investment directly to the host country government. If permission is granted
the corporation need only comply with the host country's direct investment and
exchange control regulations. If, on the other hand, the requested permission
for establishment of the proposed direct investment is refused or granted only
on terms which are discriminatory against the American company, the company
need not capitulate. Two alternatives are available to the American company.
It can take advantage of the failure of the E.E.C. to formulate a common com-
mercial policy by informing the host government that should it refuse to give
permission for the proposed direct investment, the direct investment along with
all of its economic benefits will be established in one of the other E.E.C. member
states.
If the company's attempt to use its economic leverage to gain the desired
permission for the proposed direct investment fails or if the company is too
small to possess a sufficient amount of economic leverage, it can take advantage
of the right of establishment provisions of the E.E.C. Treaty to gain the desired
permission. In order to invoke the right of establishment the American corpo-
ration must first satisfy the conditions stipulated in Article 58 of the E.E.C.
Treaty. Satisfaction of these requirements will entitle the U. S. company "to
be treated in the same way as natural persons who are nationals of member
states."1 Once the U. S. corporation has qualified as a national of a member
state it will be able to enjoy the benefits of Articles 52-57 of the E.E.C. Treaty,
which guarantee to nationals of member states the right of establishment any-
where within the E.E.C. By use of these treaty provisions the U. S. company
may gain access to that host country which had previously refused to grant per-
mission for the proposed direct investment.
II. Nationalism: A Force Stronger Than Economic Integration
A. The Problem
One of the objectives of the European Economic Community is to develop
a common commercial policy to facilitate the economic development of Western
Europe. The E.E.C., as a unified community, has not been successful in
developing the common commercial policy envisioned by the Treaty of Rome."-
Progress toward this goal has not extended beyond the stage of Committee
reports. Various reports have been submitted to the European Commission
outlining the problem and stressing the need for the formulation of a common
economic or social policy. 2 One of the most significant reports is the Colonna
10 See Treaty of Rome, art. 58.
11 See Treaty of Rome, arts. 6, 116.
12 C.E.D., supra note 8, at 21.
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Report," which emphasized the strengthening of European business enterprises
in conjunction with the formulation of a common industrial policy to promote
these European enterprises. The report was especially concerned with the high
technology sectors of industry, which are the sectors in which U. S. multinational
competition is the strongest. Several other reports have also urged the necessity
for the unification of member state commercial policies toward non-member
countries to prevent multinational companies from non-member countries from
gaining competitively advantageous positions within the E.E.C. 4
To date, no common commercial policy has been acceptable to all member
states. Each member state, therefore, continues to formulate its own commercial
policy to regulate the type and quantity of foreign direct investment it will
permit within its borders.
The causes of this difficulty in formulating a common commercial policy
among the E.E.C. member states are many. The primary reason is that each
member state finds it difficult to relinquish significant control over the manage-
ment of fundamental domestic commercial and economic policies. The member
states fear that a transfer of control over their fundamental economic policies
to the centralized institutions of the E.E.C. would involve a sacrifice of sover-
eignty. This is a step which these governments, particularly France, are not
willing to take. The fear is that the decision-makers of the institutions, being
from a community perspective, will fail to adequately consider the impact on
the individual member states.
The national governments of the member states are also experiencing an
increase in pressure from their citizens to assume greater responsibility for the
economic and social welfare of their nationals.1" Furthermore, these govern-
ments have been grappling with unfavorable balance of payments problems,
high inflation, and currency devaluation. Faced with these immediate and grave
problems the member states have been compelled to choose between concentra-
tion on their own domestic policies or concentration on their commitment to
further economic integration and non-restrictive trade within the E.E.C.' 6
The member states have tried, unsuccessfully, to strike a balance between
these two alternatives. At present, domestic pressures and the ever-present force
of nationalism have led to a commitment to local concerns. Consequently, there
exists among the member states of the E.E.C. a lack of international obligation."
The industrial, commercial, and economic policies in the E.E.C., therefore,
remains the prerogative of the individual member states despite the underlying
objective of E.E.C. membership, the development of common commercial
policies to facilitate the economic growth and development of Western Europe.
B. Consequences of Nationalism and a Possible Solution to the
Rising Tide of U. S. Multinational Corporations
The strategic planning in a multinational company is carried out by the
13 The report was submitted to the European Commission in the summer of 1971.
14 C.E.D., supra note 8, at 21.
15 CAIRNCROSS, et al., ECONOMIC POLICY FOR THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 116 (1975).
16 Id.
17 Id. at 117.
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top management at the parent company located in the home country of the
multinational corporation."8 Such planning consists of the formulation of overall
corporate objectives, policies, and strategies. The local subsidiaries, in turn, will
formulate their own objectives, policies, and strategies consistent with those
outlined by top management. The effect of this planning hierarchy is to place
the overall economic decision-making of local subsidiaries, based in member
states, in the hands of the corporate headquarters located outside the E.E.C.
This system of decision-making promotes the interests of the multinational com-
pany without consideration of the significant impact these decisions may have
on the economic welfare of the host cointry. The host countries fear that all of
this power, concentrated in the hands of multinational corporations, may weaken
or even destroy the effectiveness of host government's economic policies.19
An incident which occurred in 1976 in the United Kingdom illustrates
this problem. Chrysler, U.K. had been operating at a loss for the past several
years. The primary reason for this deficit was the lalor unrest. The Chrysler,
U.K. subsidiary, therefore, was putting a heavy drag on overall corporate profit-
ability. In the winter of 1975-1976, the President of Chrysler Corporation in
the United States decided to close out the U.K. subsidiary. Doubting the pos-
sibility of a sale, he suggested that Chrysler simply give the plants to the British
government.
The impact of such a decision for Chrysler would have been to improve
the corporation's worldwide profitability. The impact for the British economy
would have been devastating. Their economy was presently encountering high
inflation, currency devaluation, high welfare payments, and high unemploy-
ment. The shutdown of Chrysler's two large plants would have forced thousands
of laborers into the swelling ranks of the unemployed. It would have forced
the British Government to operate the two plants; the government was already
experiencing difficulty managing British Leyland, the coal and steel industries,
and the railroads.
The only alternative available to the British Government was to convince
Chrysler not to pull out of the U.K. by giving it an economic incentive to
remain. The government chose to exercise this option. The incentive took the
form of government subsidies which were guaranteed to Chrysler to make up
any losses they suffered fromn their U.K. subsidiary.
Incidents such as this have alarmed host governments around the world.
They fear what might happen in their own countries as large multinational
corporations continue to dominate large sectors of their economies. Consequent-
ly, many governments are taking a harder line toward the multinational corpo-
rations. In the E.E.C. France is the leader in such a crusade against the free
expansion of multinational corporations, especially those of American origin.
It has become evident, however, that the only viable means for France or any
other member state to effectively control the expansion of multinational corpo-
rations is through the adoption of a common commercial policy.
European leaders have been slow to do much toward the accomplishment
18 A. PIATAK, MANAGING MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 151 (1974).
19 C.E.D., supra note 8, at 36.
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of the goal of a federalized Europe. France impaired the progress in 1969 when
the Luxembourg Accords were signed by the original six member states, at the
insistence of France. The Accords reestablished the veto power of each member
state in regard to matters of national importance. Consequently, if a single
member state refuses to adopt a policy agreed to by all other member states,
provided it is an area of national importance, then the policy will not be en-
acted. Nationalism continues its reign and the European Common Market has
failed to progress beyond a customs union. No common economic or commercial
policy has been established. Regulation of foreign direct investment remains a
national concern.
Another unrealized goal of the E.E.C. is the unification of the company
law of the member states. The Commission has recognized that it is vital for
industrial concentration to occur on a Europeanwide basis in order to facilitate
the development of technology. To form European companies, the fiscal and
legal barriers to close relations and mergers between companies of different
member states must be removed by the E.E.C.20 The removal of these barriers
would be facilitated by the adoption of a European Company Law. Divergences
in the various national company laws and corporate tax laws have discouraged
the establishment, transfer, and merging of companies. The head office of a
company cannot be transferred from one member state to another without
changing its judicial status.21 Most of the mergers which occurred following the
formation of the E.E.C., therefore, have occurred between business concerns of
the same member state.22
To carry out its objective of creating European companies, the Commission
must harmonize European Company Law. In this regard, the Commission has
proposed a number of company law directives. These proposals have exerted
considerable influence on the national legislatures of the member states. The
member states have used these proposals as models for reforming their own
company law. As this process continues, the traditional barriers to transnational
mergers, due to the vastly divergent national company laws, will be removed.
It will also become easier for the national legislatures to agree to adopt Com-
munity measures on company law in the future.2 '
There are three primary political problems, however, confronting the
success of a community effort to develop an E.E.C. company law. One problem
involves the conflict as to whether there should be worker representation on the
supervisory board of a European Company. The Commission proposals and
several member states favor a two tier board system; the Board of Directors,
which is elected by the shareholders, and the Supervisory Board, which is elected
20 CAIRNCROSS, supra note 15, at 131.
21 Id. at 132.
22 In France, for example, the Institut de Developpement Industriel was set up in 1970 by
the French government to encourage concentration of most of France's largest industrials. Sud-
Aviation, Nord-Aviation, and SEREB have been merged. A government reorganization of the
electronic and chemical industries has also been completed. The U.K. government created the
Industrial Reorganization Corporation. It was given the finances in 1967 necessary to bring
about the merger of three U.K. computer companies to form International Computers, Ltd.
(ICL).
23 Schmitthoff, The Success of the Harmonization of European Company Law, 1 BUR. L.
Rnv. 100 (1976).
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by the employees. A second problem involves the difficulty in determining what
should be the tax status of a European Company. Finally, there is a problem as
to which companies should be allowed access to European incorporation. 4 The
proposed statute requires the company to have a certain size, a certain minimum
capital, fully paid in, and it must be incorporated in at least two different mem-
ber states.
Until such problems are resolved and the member states can overcome
their nationalism, the potential for a political and economic union of the E.E.C.
will remain only an illusion. The concept of a European enterprise incorporated
under a European company law to combat U. S. multinational corporations
will remain an impossibility. The "American Challenge" will have to continue
to be confronted on a national level through a system of national regulations
and business incentives similar to those currently enforced in the U.K. and
France. The foreign multinational corporations will continue to be able to
exploit the large market created by the E.E.C. American companies will be able
to use the divergent national economic policies of the member states to their
best advantage.2
Because American companies planning to extend their operations into the
European Common Market must conform to national policies and regulations
of the host country, an examination of the British and French regulations will
provide an example of what a corporation making a foreign investment in those
countries should expect.
III. Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment on a National
Level: The British and French Experiences
A. Introduction
National policies on taxation, foreign exchange controls, foreign investment
incentives, and competition are only a few areas in which the policies differ
widely among member states of the E.E.C. 6 As will be explained below, multi-
national corporations can exploit these variations in national policies to their
benefit and to the disadvantage of the particular member states involved. It is
important, therefore, for any American firm planning a direct investment in
the E.E.C. to evaluate the applicable national restrictions and regulations on
direct investments.
If the investment proposal involves a high technology industry such as
shipping, communications, banking, or the public utilities, special prohibitions
are likely to be applied by the host governments, because these industries are
24 Goldberg & Kindleberger, Toward a GATT for Investment: A Proposal for Supervision
of the International Corporation, 2 LAw & POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 399 (1970).
25 Economic integration does mean that each Member State will lose some control over its
domestic economic welfare. It will gain, on the other hand, some control over the economic
welfare of the other Member States. If they would understand this give-and-take relationship
involved in economic integration, they would understand that their fear concerning the loss of
economic sovereignty has been unfounded or, at least, overemphasized.
26 CAIRNCROSS, supra; note 15, at 138.
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held to be vital to national interests." Also, a direct investment which contem-
plates the acquisition of an existing domestic enterprise by an American com-
pany would be met with favor in some E.E.C. countries, such as the United
Kingdom, and with resistance in other E.E.C. countries, e.g., France.2"
The French Government prefers to have the acquisition of an existing
French enterprise undertaken by another French enterprise. Consequently,
French law permits a domestic competitor to intervene in the attempted acqui-
sition of a French company by a non-French company. The Ministry of Finance
will inquire as to whether another French company is willing and able to acquire
or merge with the French enterprise under consideration. If such a French
alternative is available the Ministry of Finance may refuse to give authorization
for the proposed acquisition to the American company. 9
Another item of confusion involving acquisitions is the fact that what the
American company believes to be a mere portfolio investment may be held to
be a direct investment under the law of the host country. When the sum of
capital involved is larger than a stated maximum for portfolio investment, or
when the market shares of the buyer and seller exceed a particular percentage of
the total, the investment will be regarded by the member state as a direct in-
vestment and will be subjected to the direct investment regulations rather than
to the portfolio investment regulations. The maximum amount allowed for
portfolio investment differs among the member states.
Consequently, when an American company contemplates undertaking a
direct investment in the E.E.C. it is essential for that company to analyze the
various alternatives available to it. It should analyze the investment regulations
and incentives applicable to the proposed investment in each member state. The
investment should be undertaken in the country offering the most favorable treat-
ment for the investment. It should be noted, however, that if the U. S. company
must make the investment, for business reasons, in a particular member state
whose treatment of the investment would be discriminatory against the Ameri-
can company, it may be able to overcome this discrimination by one of the
methods explained below."0
The investment regulations and incentives imposed by the United Kingdom
and France illustrate the diversity which exists within the Common Market
community. The U.K. has been traditionally receptive to American direct in-
vestments, while France has been traditionally more protective of its domestic
industry, more nationalistic in its attitude, and more hostile toward foreign direct
investment, particularly that from the United States. An American company
must be aware of these national philosophies and adjust its approach to a direct
investment project in such a way as to put the host government at ease.
B. American Direct Investment in the United Kingdom
1. Foreign Direct Investment Favored
27 King, Foreign Restrictions on U.S. Investment, 11 SAN DiGO L. REV. 32 (1973).
28 Id.
29 See text accompanying note 90 infra.
30 See Part IV infra.
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The United Kingdom is one of the largest recipients of American direct
investment. Approximately 85 % of foreign direct investment into the U.K. is
of American origin.31 The U.K. was the recipient of over 10% of American
worldwide direct investment in 1973.3
The U.K. has favored foreign direct investment, especially from the U.S.A.,
for two major reasons. The U.K. is primarily an exporter of finished goods.
The goods produced for export by the U. S. subsidiaries located in the U.K.
make a positive contribution to the U.K. balance of trade. In 1972, for example,
U. S. subsidiaries produced over 17%'of the total U.K. exports.3 Moreover,
foreign direct investment is favored because many U.K. business firms are multi-
national corporations and think in terms of world markets rather than in terms
of national markets. In contrast, most European companies on the continent
think solely in terms of domestic markets. Few of these companies are true
multinational corporations. The continental businesses view the rising influx
of U. S. direct investment as an attempt by American companies to dominate
the Western European economy. The U.K., on the other hand, views U. S.
multinational company direct investments, not as an attempt to dominate the
European economy, but as an attempt to maintain its share of the world
market. 4
Over the past several years, however, even British enthusiasm for U. S.
company subsidiaries has dwindled because U. S. parent companies tend to take
up 100% ownership of their foreign operations and maintain tight control over
the financial and economic affairs of these subsidiaries. 5 Such control has gener-
ated concern on the part of the British Government because of the presumed
effect that this external control has on the economic and political sovereignty
of the U.K." Foreign control over these subsidiaries creates, at least, a potential
31 M. STEUER, P. ABELL, J. GENNARD, M. PERLMAN, R. REES, B. SCOTT, & K. WALLIS,
THE IMPACT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT ON THE UNITED KINGDOM 5-10 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as STEUER].
32 The following table, prepared by the U.S. Department of Commerce, Survey of Current
Business (1974), shows the percent of total U.S. direct investment in the U.K. and in the
original six E.E.C. countries between 1965 and 1974:
U.S. Direct Investment
(Book value- all industries, $ billions)
year World U.K. E.E.C.
value % value % 'value %
1965 49.5 - 5.1 - 6.3 -
1966 54.8 10.7 5.7 11.8 7.6 20.6
1967 59.5 8.6 6.1 7.0 8.4 10.5
1968 65.0 9.2 6.7 9.8 9.0 7.1
1969 71.0 9.2 7.2 7.5 10.3 14.4
1970 78.2 10.1 8.0 11.1 11.8 14.5
1971 86.2 10.2 9.0 12.5 13.6 15.3
1972 94.3 9.4 9.6 6.6 15.7 15.4
1973 107.3 13.7 11.1 15.6 19.3 22.9
1974 118.6 12.0 12.5 10.0 21.7 18.5
33 Lincoln, U.S. Direct Investment in the U.K.: Has the Optimism Been Justified?, 23
Q.E.R. SPECIAL REPORT 2 (1975). The contribution by U.S. subsidiary exports on an industry
basis is as follows: U.S. subsidiaries produced over 45% of U.K. motor vehicle exports, 23% of
U.K. metal manufacturing and engineering exports, and 17% of U.K. chemical and allied in-
dustries exports.
34 S. HYMER & R. ROWTHORN, MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL
OLIGOPOLY: THE NON-AMERICAN CHALLENGE 72 (1969).
35 STEUER, supra note 31, at 7.4.
36 Lincoln, supra note 33, at 8.
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shift of some decision-making to outside the host country." The parent company
located in the United States may direct the local subsidiary to produce a certain
product, lay off a certain number of employees, or make other decisions of a
financial or economic nature. These decisions are being made in satisfaction of
the best interests of the parent company irrespective of the economic welfare of
the U.K. As a result of this perceived threat to British autonomy, foreign direct
investment is becoming subject to closer scrutiny.
2. The U.K. Is a Favored Host Country of U. S. Multinational Corporations
The policy employed by the host country is a major determinant of whether
a U. S. company will invest in that country. The attitude with which the host
country government perceives the economic, social, and political affects of for-
eign direct investment influences the choices of potential investors. Part of the
reason for the U.K.'s popularity among American corporations is, therefore,
that the U.K. generally perceives foreign direct investment as having a net bene-
ficial effect. The new technology, management skills, tax revenue, labor training,
and contribution to the U.K. balance of trade outweigh any negative effects
which may be associated with the direct investment. As will be seen, France,
on the other hand, perceives foreign direct investment as a serious threat to its
national sovereignty, economic welfare, and the survival and growth of domestic
industry. Therefore, France maintains a very restrictive attitude toward foreign
direct investment.
Aside from its favorable policy, American multinational corporations favor
the U.K. as a host country because the U.K. provides a tariff-free springboard
to the large markets in the E.E.C. and the Commonwealth. The U.K. also offers
to the U. S. multinational corporation a large skilled labor force with a common
language and heritage. Further, the U.K. labor force has the lowest wage rate
of all the E.E.C. countries.3"
A fourth factor operating to enhance the attractiveness of investment in
Britain concerns the fact that the U.K. has been politically stable. There has
been a general respect for the rule of law, and no nationalization of foreign
corporations. There also have been fewer post-war governments than in either
France or Italy. The bureaucracy involved in the procedure provided for ob-
taining permission to make the investment is relatively small. London provides
easy access to the Eurodollar market, because it is the financial center of Europe,
and repatriation of profit presents little difficulty. 9 Finally, the average rate of
return on U. S. direct investment in the U.K. has been appreciably superior to
that in the original six E.E.C. countries.4"
3. Investment Regulations
The Exchange Control Act of 1947, as amended in July, 1973 and De-
37 Foreign Investment in Britain, [19761 1 DOING BUSINESS IN EUROPE (OCH) 1 23,651.
38 In 1970, for example, the hourly wage rate in the U.K. was 40% of the U.S. hourly
wage rate for comparable jobs.
39 Lincoln, supra note 33, at 19.
40 In 1971 the return on U.S. direct investment was 10.9% in the U.K. and 6.3% in the
original six E.E.C. countries. See Lincoln, supra note 33, at 23 passim
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cember, 1974, under the section entitled Inward Direct Investment,41 sets forth
the general policy of the U.K.: "The general policy of Her Majesty's Govern-
ment is to welcome direct investment in the U.K. by non-residents provided it
is appropriately financed."42 If an investing company is not certain that it has
the appropriate financing, it may make an application to the Bank of England
for a comment on whether its proposed financing procedure is acceptable or
requires modification. Exchange control permission must be acquired not only
for all investment by persons not resident in the Scheduled Territories,4 3 but also
for those investments by persons, regardless of where they are resident, which
involves, directly or indirectly, the loss of control by U.K. residents of existing
U.K. companies.44
The U.K. Government will consider on a case-by-case basis those proposals
involving the take-over by nonresidents of existing U.K. companies which by
their size or nature constitute a vital part of British industry. Furthermore, the
Bank of England requires that all applicable requirement of the City Panel on
Take-Overs and Mergers are met.45 If the foreign direct investment involves
amounts less than £50,000, and no special national interests are involved, then
the Bank of England has the authority to grant or deny permission for the
investment." In all other cases, approval is required from the Treasury, which
acts in consultation with the Department of Trade and Industry."
The Exchange Control Act normally requires that the financing of the
investment be either in sterling from an external account4 s or in currency.49
Once the fixed assets have been appropriately financed, however, the subsidiary
of a foreign company will normally be given free access to sterling borrowing
within the U.K. for working capital purposes. These regulations are not appli-
cable to companies or residents of other E.E.C. countries and those companies
not indirectly owned by residents of non-sterling third countries. Such companies
may borrow sterling in the U.K. without limit for direct investment purposes
in the U.K.5" This discrimination in favor of E.E.C. established companies is
required by the E.E.C. Treaty and directives on capital movements.5
41 Inward direct investment is defined by the Exchange Control Act of 1947, as amended,
to include: "those investments in which the investor establishes, expands, or consolidates an
economic enterprise with the intention of participating in its management and operation; and
trade investments where the investor establishes or maintains commercial links with other
companies to further his existing business."
42 The Bank of England, A Guide to United Kingdom Exchange Control 12 (Dec. 10,
1974).
43 "Scheduled Territories" is defined in the Exchange Control Act of 1947 as those terri-
tories comprising the U.K. including the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man, the Republic of
Ireland, and Gibraltar.
44 The Bank of England, supra note 42, at 12.
45 Id.
46 Foreign Investment in Britain, [1976] 1 DOING BUSINESS IN EUROPE (CCH) 11 23,652.
47 Id.
48 Sterling from an external account refers to any sterling which the foreign investor is
able to acquire outside of the U.K.
49 An exception to this general rule exists when there is an establishment of a new plant
in a development area. In such a case financing within theU.K. is permitted.
50 STEUER, supra note 31, at 9.10, 9.11.
51 Article 67 of the Treaty of Rome states: "During the transitional period and to the
extent necessary to ensure the proper functioning of the Common Market, Member States shall
progressively abolish between themselves all restrictions on the movement of capital belonging
to persons resident in Member States and any discrimination based on nationality or on the
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When foreign direct investment involves the take-over, by nonresidents, of
existing U.K. companies, the Department of Trade and Industry will examine
the general desirability of the proposed take-over. The Department of Trade
and Industry determines if the proposed take-over satisfies the following criteria
established as guidelines for acceptable take-overs: 52 (1) "the investment must
make an 'appropriate' contribution to foreign exchange reserves."53 The term
"appropriate contribution" means that the amount of foreign capital brought
into the U.K. to finance the fixed assets of the company must be proportionate
to the interest which the foreign company has in the subsidiary. (2) The price
given as consideration must be a fair one. It must reflect the fair market value
of the assets acquired by the foreign enterprise. 4 (3) Any further financing
of fixed assets must be provided from sources outside the U.K., at least, in
proportion to the amount of interest acquired by the foreign firm.55
Whenever a foreign investor makes a share purchase in the market which
would give the investor a 10% control of the equity of a U.K. company, the
general permission for market purchases does not apply and the investor must
obtain the specific permission of the Bank of England before purchase of the
shares can be made. 6 Moreover, regardless of the percentage of control in-
volved, if the foreign investor intends to participate in the management or
operation of the company whose shares are so acquired, the rules for inward
direct investment must be complied with, not the rules for inward portfolio
investment. The investor who wishes only to be subject to the rules for a
portfolio investment must not acquire enough shares to give him a 10% control
of the firm.
If the investment gives the investor a 10% control of the British enterprise,
this percentage of ownership is deemed to be sufficient to give the investor a
significant voice in the management of the enterprise. The British Government
therefore requires that a purchase of shares involving 10% control of the equity
be treated as a direct investment. The investor should make clear his intention
to the U.K. that he is acquiring the shares solely as a financial investment and
with no intention of participating in the management of the enterprise.
A further trap for the unwary exists when the investment involves more
than £500,000 and the market shares of the buyer and seller exceed 33 percent.
The proposed investment must then be reviewed by the Department of Trade
and Industry and referred to the Monopolies Commission for approval. The
place of residence of the parties or on the place where such capital is invested."
Article 69 empowers the European Council, on a proposal from the European Commission,
to issue the necessary directives for the progressive implementation of the provisions of Article
67. See STEUER, supra note 31, at 9.10, 9.11.
52 STEUER, supra note 31, at If 9.6 lists the criteria used as of April, 1972.
53 Foreign Investment in Britain, [1976] 1 DOING BUINESS IN EUROPE (CCH) f 23,653.
An exception exists where the new firm's activities are centered in a development area or other
areas which the Ministry of Trade and Industry designates.
54 Id.
55 Id. Same exception applies to this criterion as applied to the first criterion. Further, this
requirement is not necessary for financing needed for working capital purposes.
56 The Bank of England, supra note 42, at 24, explains when the general permission for
the purchase of sterling securities is applicable. A purchase which gives the purchaser a 10%
control of the equity is no longer considered to be a sterling securities purchase only. Therefore,
specific permission must be obtained from the Bank of England for the purchase.
57 Id. at 22.
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Monopolies Commission will investigate the possibility that the investment will
give monopoly status to the American investor in the particular industry involved
in the investment. The Monopolies Commission will then file a report with the
Minister of Trade and Industry stating its reasons for or against the proposed
investment. The Minister has the authority to make the final decision concerning
this investment proposal.5"
A final exchange control concern arises when a company, which is con-
trolled by outsiders, wishes to repatriate profits or remit dividends to the parent
company located in another country. Before this can be done, a specific appli-
cation must be tendered to the Bank of England in accordance with the Ex-
change Control Act. The Bank will normally authorize such payments provided
they represent earned trading profits or investment income.59 Capital which the
foreign investor has directly invested may be repatriated to the parent company
at any time, provided that the original entry of the capital into the U.K. was
properly approved.6" Any subsequent loans from parent companies to their U.K.
subsidiaries also require exchange control approval.
Permission for the establishment of a direct investment may be subject to
specific conditions, especially when the investment is to be made in industries
designated as nationally important industries by the Department of Trade and
Industry. The foreign investor may be required to give assurances about his
future intentions. The foreign investor may have to guarantee, for example,
"the retention of a majority of British directors on the company's board, the
fulfillment of existing contractual obligations, commitment to a progressive
increase in exports, maintenance of existing research and development programs,
or a promise that there will be no reduction in the labor force."'"
There are no sanctions that the U.K. Government can enforce, however,
if the investing company breaches any of these assurances, nor is there any sys-
tematic procedure available to review the foreign company's performance with
respect to them.62 The British Government relies solely on the good faith and
social responsibility of the foreign company to fulfill its assurances. Normally,
the company's own self-interest dictates adherence to the assurances. A breach
of this good faith requirement will deeply impair the foreign company's credi-
bility. Future requests by such a company for investment permission will be
denied or shackled with stiff regulations.
Upon full compliance with all of the requirements stipulated in the Ex-
change Control Act the local subsidiary or branch is endowed with all of the
rights and liabilities accruing to a British company. The importance of this will
be seen in the discussion dealing with the right of establishment under the E.E.C.
Treaty.
4. Investment Incentives
In addition to exchange control requirements, the American investor must
58 King, supra note 27, at 34.
59 The Bank of England, sup-a note 42, at 15.
60 Id.
61 Foreign Inuestment in Britain, [1976] 1 DoING BUSINESS IN EUROPE. (CCH) ff 23,661.
62 STEUE, super note 31, at 9.19.
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also examine the various business incentives offered by the host country to attract
and encourage direct investment to a particular industry or a particular geo-
graphic area experiencing a lack of economic growth, modernization, or pro-
ductivity. Having experienced a decline of its older industries such as coal min-
ing, engineering, and shipbuilding, the U.K. has incurred a high level of unem-
ployment, minimal economic growth, an increase in old and obsolete plant and
equipment, and net outward migration in the geographic areas where these in-
dustries once flourished.6" There is a present and urgent need for redevelopment
of these areas.
Business incentives in the U.K. take the form of development grants or
selective assistance. Development grants are awarded for the introduction of
new plants, machinery, buildings, investment, and employee training in an
assisted area.64 The schedule of development areas was expanded in 1972 to
include over 65% of Great Britain. Grants for new plants and machinery were
also expanded due to the government's recognition of the need for updating the
depreciated and obsolete plant and equipment which presently exist in the
U.K.65
Selective assistance is provided in various forms, such as medium-term loans
on preferential terms or removal grants of up to 80% of all reasonable costs
necessary for the transfer of plant and machinery from one area of the U.K. into
an assisted area. Finally, tax allowances on a national level is another form
of business incentive employed by the U.K.
6 7
Any American company can take advantage of these incentives by inform-
ing the Department of Trade and Industry of its intention to invest in an assisted
area of the U.K.6
From this discussion it is apparent that, even though general concern about
foreign direct investment and the demand for closer government supervision
63 Northeast Development Council, Regional Policies in Britain and in Europe (Oct. 1971).
It should be noted that the U.K.'s admission to the Common Market has posed a serious
problem for the U.K. government because, "E.E.C. regional policies are directed predominantly
toward semi-industrial or agricultural areas, such as the Republic of Ireland, Southern Italy,
and Southwestern France, where no highly developed infrastructure similar to that in the U.K.
exists." Thus, the E.E.C. regional policies may prohibit the U.K. from offering incentives for
investment that would aid in curing its complex industrial redevelopment problems.
64 There are three types of assisted areas: (1) the Special Development Areas, (2) Devel-
opment Areas, and (3) Intermediate Areas. The first two areas are desiqnated in the Indust-ial
Development Act of 1966, the Public General Acts and Measures of 1966, and the Industry
Act of 1972, § 1(4). Intermediate Areas are designated under the Local Employment Act of
1970, and Public General Acts and Measures of 1970, Chapter 7 as amended.
65 Lincoln, supra note 33, at 40-42.
66 Foreign Investments in Britain, [1976] 1 DOING BUSINESS IN EUROPE (CCH) 1 23,908.
67 The Finance Act of 1972, § 67(2) (a) permits a 100% first year tax allowance for
capital expenditures incurred anywhere in the U.K. on plant and machinery.
68 The common regional policy of the E.E.C. is directed at areas in the E.E.C. which
have an agricultural bias. The regional policy proposals expounded by the European Commission
with regard to "central areas" and "development areas" do not have immediate relevance for
the problems of industrial redevelopment in the U.K. "There is, therefore, growing concern in
the U.K. that some of the business incentives will be eroded by the Commission's proposals,
particularly if a ceiling on government aids is imposed in certain central areas that are in need
of redevelopment." See Treaty of Rome, arts. 92-94. Of importance is Article 92(3) (c) which
permits a Member State to grant aid to "facilitate the development of certain economic activities
or areas. . . ." While this would seem to indicate that U.K. incentives would not run afoul of
the E.E.C. common regional policy, Article 92 (c) (3) must be read along with Article 94 which
enables the Council to "make any appropriate regulations for application of Articles 92 and 93,"
which would include setting ceilings on government aid.
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is on the increase, the United Kingdom has continued to maintain a favorable
policy toward foreign direct investment, especially that direct investment origi-
nating in the U.S.A. This is so because the benefits which accrue to both the
American multinational corporations and the U.K. economy are satisfactory
to both parties.
The main concern for the American multinational corporation is the future
of the U.K. economy. The rate of inflation, domestic demand and productivity
are the main concerns. The apparent bleakness of the U.K. economy, however,
may be offset by the fact that Great Britain's membership in the E.E.C. has
opened a market of 200 million more customers to the U.K. based subsidiaries.
Further offsetting the apparent cloud on the U.K. economy has been the pros-
pect of the North Sea oil.
C. American Direct Investment in France
1. Direct Investment Defined
According to the French government a direct investment is: "(1) the pur-
chase, creation or extension of a business, branch, or any partnership or sole
proprietorship; (2) all other operations, which alone or simultaneously or suc-
cessively with others, that enable a person or persons to obtain or increase con-
trol of a company . . . , whatever may be its form, or to insure the extension
of a company already under its or their control."69
The emphasis in this definition is on control. Government practice, in
determining the extent of control involved in an inward direct investment, has
been to look not only at the actual percentage of the domestic company's equity
controlled by the investor, but also at other factors (including loans, patents,
and licenses) which might contribute to the influence that the investor can use
to gain control over the French enterprise."0 Consequently, even a small capital
investment may constitute a direct investment when connected with one or
more of these other factors. The difficulty, therefore, for a foreign investor is to
determine whether his planned investment will be categorized as a direct invest-
ment subject to regulation by the Ministry of Finance. 1
Under part two of the above definition, a direct investment is one that
involves an acquisition of more than 20% of the capital of a French company
which is listed on the stock exchange. Moreover, direct investment includes
direct or indirect loans or advances to a foreign-controlled company by its non-
resident owners or by foreign enterprises in the same affiliated group, and direct
or indirect guarantees furnished by nonresidents for their firms in France. 2
69 Decree No. 67-78 of Jan. 27, 1967, arts. 2 and 3 as modified by Decree No. 69-264 of
Mar. 21, 1969, and Decree No. 71-143 of Feb. 22, 1971.
70 Foreign Investment in France, [1976] 1 DOING BUSINESS IN EUROPE (CCH) % 22,654.
71 The Ministry of Finance requires that, before an inward direct investment may be made,
a prior declaration or request for prior authorization be made by the foreign investor. "Spe-
cifically, a prior declaration or request for prior authorization must be made for an investment
which involves the transfer of a participation in the capital of a French company between
individuals or legal entities whose customary residence or head office is in a foreign country."
72 Foreign Investment in France, [1976] 1 DOING BUSINESS xN EUROPE (COH) 1 30,753.
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All transactions concerning the same company must be viewed together, even
if each occurs at a separate time, in determining whether the transactions are
to be treated as a single foreign direct investment. The French government
utilizes an integration doctrine. Thus, if a French company is placed in a state
of economic dependency because of the investment, whether an acquisition or
otherwise, the company is considered as being under foreign control. The trans-
actions, therefore, constitute a direct investment.
Prior to 1974, the only exemption from the requirement of a prior declara-
tion and request for prior authorization73 for foreign investments involved an
investment participation in 20% or less of the French company's capital. At
present, the exemption applies in cases of certain direct investment provided
that the total amount of all direct investments made in any one French company
within a one-year period does not exceed F.2 million. 4 There are four categories
of direct investment which fall within this exemption:
(1) Increases in the capital of a French company in which foreign partici-
pation has previously been authorized, provided they do not result in any
increase in the percentage participation of any non-resident shareholder in
such company;
(2) Increases in the capital allowances of, or funds available to, a French
branch or establishment of a non-resident enterprise whose creation has
been previously authorized;
(3) Loans to a French company under foreign control made by its non-
resident shareholders or by foreign enterprises of the same group, and loans
made to a French establishment of a foreign company made either by such
foreign company or foreign enterprises of the same group, provided that
in each case the terms of the loan meet certain specified requirements;
(4) Guarantees for the benefit of a French company accorded to it by non-
residents who control it or by foreign enterprises of the same group relating
to loans in foreign currency contracted by such company.
75
In every instance, the payments coming from non-residents to the French com-
pany must be the result of the sale of foreign currency on the foreign exchange
market or French francs from external French franc accounts.
7 6
These exemptions rarely occur due to the fact that the French government
exercises an unfettered discretion as to which transactions will qualify for the
exemption. This is so regardless of whether the transaction would technically
fit into one of the four categories described above. Consequently, almost all
investment proposals will be subjected to the formal procedures outlined below.
2. Procedures Followed by French Government
Obtaining a prior authorization is very cumbersome. The French govern-
73 See note 77 infra.
74 Decree No. 74-721 of Jul. 26, 1974.
75 Foreign Investment in France, [1976] 1 DOINo BUSINESS IN EUROPE (CCH) % 22,655.
76 Id. Decree No. 67-78 of Jan. 27, 1967, also made an exemption for those direct invest-
ments which originate in countries within the French franc zone, i.e., those countries whose
central bank has an account agreement with the French Treasury. Further, the exemption
extends to the increase of capital through the plowing back of the company's undistributed
earnings. See Arr~t6 of July 26, 1974, art. 1.
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ment has instituted a set of procedures which it follows in investigating a pro-
posed direct investment to determine whether or not to grant a prior authoriza-
tion. The investing company must file a prior declaration and request for prior
authorization with the Ministry of Finance." This prior declaration and request
for prior authorization must include: information about the potential investor;
the company in which it plans to invest; the type and the amount of the invest-
ment; the means for financing the investment; and, the benefits it will contribute
to the French economic welfare.18 The Ministry of Finance may consult any
other governmental departments for comments and recommendations concern-
ing the proposed investment prior to giving authorization for the investment.
The Ministry of Finance must reply within sixty days to the non-resident in-
vestor. Failure to reply within this period acts as an approval of the proposed
investment and the investor is free to proceed with the investment. 9
There is, however, a delay tactic available to the Ministry of Finance. The
Ministry may, at any time within this sixty-day period, call for a postponement
of the investment to allow for further investigation or to permit the investor to
make changes to correct government objections.8" By resorting to this delaying
tactic, the French government can obviously prevent a direct investment from
taking place without providing any explanation to the investor. The net result
is that the Ministry of Finance may grant or refuse requests for prior authoriza-
tion without being required to state the grounds for its decision within any
particular time period. This makes planning *a direct investment in France
extremely difficult, especially when a specific timetable is involved. Delay tactics
may be used by the French government to discourage the direct investment.
Moreover, the non-resident investor has no legal remedy available to him; these
preventive practices are specifically contemplated by the French regulations.
Once the foreign investor has made a direct investment he must submit
a report to the Ministry of Finance on special forms obtained from the Ministry
within twenty days.8 ' This applies to all direct investments regardless of whether
or not it was subject to a prior declaration. If no prior declaration was required
for the direct investment at issue, then the report must be supplemented by a
memorandum detailing the specifics of the direct investment.
3. Exchange Controls Used to Supplement Regulation of Direct Investment
Foreign direct investment is also regulated by exchange control require-
77 The prior declaration or request for prior authorization is a declaration of intention made
by the non-resident investor. It should include the specifics of the proposed investment and an
estimate of the benefits the investment will bring to the French economy.
78 The benefits which the French government views favorably include a positive contribution
to the balance of trade by increasing exports and decreasing imports, the introduction of new
technology, an increase in employment and training of French workers, and development of the
depressed areas of France. If the investment provides a net benefit to the French economy, the
French government will be more inclined toward giving the needed authorization for the
investment.
79 Torem & Craig, Developments in the Control of Foreign Investments in France, 70
Miir. L. REv. 286 ('1971).
80 Id.
81 See Arr6 of July 26, 1974, art. 3 and Circular of July 26, 1974.
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ments8 2 All transfers of capital between France and foreign countries or, within
France, between residents and non-residents must be accomplished via an
approved intermediary,"3 unless the exchange operations have been granted a
prior authorization by the Ministry of Finance. 4 It is important to note that
foreign individuals or entities become residents (for exchange control purposes
only) once they have been established in France for a minimum of two years.
Two major types of transactions are prohibited unless prior authorization
has been granted by the Ministry of Finance.
First, all transfer or exchange operations in France which lead to the estab-
lishment by a resident of foreign deposits or to the holding in France by a
resident of means of payment against a foreign country. Second, the im-
portation and exportation of (i) means of payment (drafts, checks, and
notes) other than through an approved intermediary or, within specified
limits, by resident or non-resident travelers or (in the case of the export of
drafts) by importers and exporters, and (ii) securities other than through
an approved intermediary.8 5
A major consideration of the French Government when it decided to reim-
pose exchange controls in 1968 was the directive from the E.E.C. Commission
ordering France to free from control those direct investments originating in other
member states.8" France did not want to relinquish control over any direct in-
vestment, regardless of its place of origin. France believed its main obligation
was to protect and promote the economic welfare of its people. It complied,
however, with the European Commission's order. To compensate for the re-
moval of regulation over direct investments originating in the E.E.C., France
made parallel changes in its exchange control laws. These changes effectively
subjected the investments coming from within the E.E.C. to all the regulations
which existed prior to the European Commission's order.
Thus, under the present direct investment regulations, investments origi-
nating in other member states are subject only to the requirement of making
a prior declaration with the Ministry of Finance. The E.E.C. investor is not
required to make a request for prior authorization from the Ministry of Finance.
The exchange controls, however, are applicable and require the E.E.C. investor
to obtain authorization from the Ministry of Finance. This procedure, tech-
nically, does not conflict with the directive issued by the Commission. Con-
sequently, France still maintains strict control over all foreign direct investment
regardless of its place of origin.
82 Decree No. 68-1021 of Nov. 24, 1968, reimposed exchange controls as an answer to the
growing financial crisis in France in 1968 because the French government feared that devalua-
tion of the French franc might become necessary. For a further discussion concerning the re-
imposition of exchange controls, see Torem & Craig, supra note 79, at 289.
83 An approved intermediary includes a commercial bank approved by the Ministry of
Finance. These banks handle the transactions which are permitted under a "general authoriza-
tion" as set forth in Decree No. 68-1021, supra note 82.
84 Foreign Investment in France, [1976] 1 DoING BusINESS IN EUROPE (CCH) 1 22,682.
85 Id. at U 22,683.
86 Article 48 of the Treaty of Rome requires that all restrictions on the movement of
workers within the Community must be abolished. Article 59 provides the same requirement
with respect to freedom to provide services anywhere within the Community. Article 58
provides for the Freedom of Establishment within the Community. Frances imposition of direct
investment regulations on those investments originating within the E.E.C. was in direct
violation of these articles.
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Repatriation of capital must also be carried out through an approved inter-
mediary bank. If remittance is for a sum less than F.1,000,000, it will usually
be permitted without the investor having to obtain prior approval from the
Ministry of Finance. In contrast, if the sum to be repatriated is greater than
F.1,000,000 prior approval must be obtained from the Ministry of Finance."'
Prior approval is, however, generally granted.
4. France: The Most Restrictive Member State
French direct investment regulations are the most complex and severe of
any Common Market country. There are two principal reasons for this attitude
on the part of the French Government. One is that the French Government is
concerned about the ability of the foreign-controlled subsidiary to exert a strong
influence over those sectors of the domestic economy in which the investment is
involved. The foreign parent company will often make financial and economic
decisions for the French subsidiary. France believes that these decisions, which
affect the French economy, are not being made with the French economic
welfare in mind."8
A prime example of this occurred in the late 1960's, when several American-
owned subsidiaries closed down their French operations. This resulted in the
laying-off of French laborers without consultation with the French Government.
Consequently, the French Government was unable to provide for the immediate
absorption of the workers into other areas of employment.8 9
The second reason for France's restrictive attitude stems from its concern
that American companies, by concentrating their investments in high technology
areas, will take total control of these industries. The French Government does
not want key sectors of its industry dominated by corporations which are under
foreign control. Consequently, France's policy has been one of close scrutiny
and tight control.
Generally, the French Government will grant permission for the establish-
ment of a direct investment project, provided that the investment is not centered
in an industry deemed to be critical by the French Government, or in an industry
which is presently dominated by foreign-controlled companies. Should the in-
vestment project involve a critical industry or an industry which is heavily
dominated by foreign-controlled companies, the investment will encounter severe
resistance or complete refusal.
The best-known example of an investment refusal concerning a critical
industry is that of General Electric's (G.E.) bid in 1964 to take a minority share
in Compagnie des Machines Bull (Bull), the largest French computer com-
pany." (The computer industry is deemed to be a critical industry by the
French Government.) In 1962, Bull found that it could not keep abreast of
the technological advances of International Business Machines' (IBM) French
87 King, supra note 27, at 44.
88 KRAUSE, supra note 6, at 145.
89 Id.
90 0. FULDA & W. ScHWARTZ, REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT
575-79 (1970).
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subsidiary. It simply did not have the financial resources to maintain the re-
search and development to compete with IBM. Bull reached a tentative agree-
ment with G.E. to sell 700,000 new shares of stock to G.E. at $40 per share.
This would give Bull an injection of $28 million and provide Bull with needed
technical assistance and research facilities.
The Ministry of Finance refused to give the requisite prior authorization
for the 20% acquisition by G.E. It felt that such an acquisition would result
in the domination of Bull by G.E., and the domination of the French computer
industry by American companies. The French Government preferred a French
solution to Bull's problems. Two French electronics companies, C.S.F. and
C.G.E., and an association of French banks headed by the Banque de Paris,
would provide technical and financial assistance to Bull.
Subsequently, however, the French Government became convinced that
only G.E. could provide the necessary technical and managerial assistance. As
a result of this conviction, the French Government approved the formation of
two companies, the manufacturing company controlled by Bull and the sales
company controlled by G.E. A third company was formed by the French
Government to do the marketing research and advertising. This third company
was also to be controlled by Bull. Finally, the French Government required that
Bull, alone, was to perform all of the French defense work in the computer field.
The French Government was thus extremely hostile to the original G.E.
proposal in 1962 and severely limited G.E.'s functions in the final solution,
achieved more than two years later. This incident illustrates how an American
company can be delayed when attempting to make a direct investment in France.
If an American company is confined by a rigid deadline for the direct invest-
ment, the potential of a long delay should be kept in mind when planning the
timetable for the proposed direct investment. This is especially true when the
proposed investment involves a critical sector of the French economy.
5. The Effect of the E.E.C. Treaty on French Policy
France has been compelled to relax some of its prohibitions due to the
E.E.C. Treaty, which provides that the movement of products between member
states must be free from tariffs.91 If the French Government prohibits a partic-
ular direct investment proposal, the American company may be able to establish
that same investment in one of the other E.E.C. member states. As a result of
the tariff-free movement of goods among member states, the U. S. subsidiary
in another E.E.C. country will be able to market its products in France at prices
competitive with domestically produced goods,92 despite the French Govern-
ment's effort to prohibit the investment. Moreover, by compelling the U. S.
company to invest elsewhere in the E.E.C., France will lose all benefits of the
investment and thereby give a competitive advantage to the host country receiv-
ing the American company's direct investment. The lack of a common policy
toward direct investment coming from outside of the E.E.C. thus enables U. S.
91 See Treaty of Rome, art. 9.
92 R. DICrIc, FOREIGN INVESTMENT: FRANCE 72 (1970).
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multinational corporations to gain obviously advantageous positions. Because
of the disparity in policies, France has been forced to permit the establishment
of foreign direct investments it normally would have refused.
6. Factors Helpful to Those Desiring to Invest' in France
To help ensure approval of a proposed direct investment by the French
Government the American company should consider emphasizing one or more
of the following effects when it makes its proposal to the French Government.
American companies which have included some of these factors have been
looked upon favorably by the French Government."3 First, the American com-
pany should clearly point out that its investment will make a positive contri-
bution to the French balance of trade. A positive contribution will result when
the foreign investor manufactures products which France formerly had to im-
port or when the foreign investor produces a product which France can export.
Second, any positive contribution to France's balance of payments should
also be indicated. This will occur when the non-resident investor brings in
foreign capital which must be converted into French francs on the official
exchange market.3 4 Such a positive effect will not result if the financing is not
done through franc financing on the French market. If an American company
desires approval from the Ministry of Finance it must finance the investment
with foreign currency or with French francs acquired "from non-French money
markets.
The U. S. company should also consider whether it needs to make the
direct investment by acquiring an existing French enterprise or whether it can
build a new plant. The French Government gives a more favorable treatment to
an investment proposal which provides for the establishment of a new company
rather than the acquisition of an existing French company, because the French
Government prefers the influx of new plant, machinery, and equipment.
Another factor which will enhance an American company's chance of
receiving the necessary authorization for its investment proposal is to guarantee
to the French Government that it will establish a research facility in France.
This is particularly critical if the industry involved in the direct investment con-
cerns new scientific developments. France wants to be certain that its domestic
technology will not be deprived of the new research developments. The French
Government believes that French industry should participate in the new tech-
nological developments, not just be a recipient of new technology developed
elsewhereY5
Several regions in France are economically depressed. Investment appli-
cations offering to establish new plants in the listed development areas will
receive a more enthusiastic response from the Ministry of Finance.
A final factor for the investing company to consider is that the French
Government is afraid that direct investment will result in part of its economy
93 See Torem & Craig, supra note 79.
94 Id. at 318.
95 Id. at 320.
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being controlled from outside of France. One way to help the French Govern-
ment overcome this fear is to install French citizens in key positions in the parent
company itself. IBM, for example, named a French native as the President
of IBM World Trade Corporation." Several other members of the board of
directors are also citizens of countries other than the U.S.A.
D. Conclusion
France's attitude is still one of protectionism, due to its strong sense of
nationalism. The U.K., on the other hand, maintains a broader worldwide
outlook. This explains, in part, the divergence in policies concerning foreign
direct investment. France is learning through experience that merely prohibiting
undesired foreign investment is not the answer. French policy, generally, is to
require authorization from the Ministry of Finance for all direct investment
including that originating in other E.E.C. member states. The French Govern-
ment maintains strict control over the amount and the nature of the foreign
direct investment. Approval, however, will generally be given by the French
Government unless a critical sector of the domestic economy is involved in the
investment. The U.K. Government, in contrast, does not attempt to maintain
close control over foreign direct investments. It employs a policy receptive to
foreign direct investment, particularly that originating in the United States.
IV. Lack of a Common Commercial Policy Benefits
U. S. Multinational Corporations
The divergence of the national laws of the member states and the lack of
a common commercial policy have provided a vehicle whereby U. S. companies
are able to gain an advantage over their European competitors. U. S. multi-
national corporations are economically strong enough to establish subsidiary
operations throughout the Common Market. Most European companies lack
such economic strength and are unable to increase that strength via transnational
mergers with other European companies. Competition, therefore, for the U. S.
subsidiary is primarily only on a national level.
Because of their diverse locations in the E.E.C., the U. S. multinational cor-
porations can easily transfer goods, management personnel, technology, and
capital from a subsidiary in one member state to one in another member state.
A foreign multinational company, therefore, can draw on a vastly larger pool of
resources than can its local national competitors.
This economic strength of U. S. multinational corporations, combined with
the divergent national commercial policies with respect to treatment of foreign
direct investment, has given the U. S. company another large advantage. The
U. S. company is able to use its economic leverage in conjunction with a threat
to establish its direct investment proposal elsewhere within the E.E.C. to gain
favorable treatment from an otherwise reluctant host country. Consequently,
when a member state imposes strict regulations on a U. S. direct investment
96 Id. at 322.
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proposal, the U. S. company, because of its economic strength, may be able to
persuade that host country to relax its restrictions lest the U. S. company take
its direct investment proposal to a member state which has a more favorable
attitude.
It is important for a U. S. company seeking to establish a direct investment
in an E.E.C. member state to understand that the restrictions imposed by a
member state may be relaxed if the U. S. company is able to implement its
economic leverage on the member state. The procedure involves negotiations
between the member state government and the U. S. company, in which the
U. S. company makes apparent the benefits that its direct investment will bring
to the host country as well as its ability to gain favorable treatment elsewhere in
the E.E.C. should the host country refuse to cooperate with the U. S. multi-
national corporation. Also, the U. S. company will be able to point out that
if it goes elsewhere in the Common Market it can sell its goods tariff-free in the
stubborn member state.
Because of the lack of a common commercial policy American multi-
national corporations can circumvent unfavorable treatment which they would
otherwise be subjected to by a host government such as France. If France,
for example, prohibited an American company from undertaking a direct invest-
ment project within its borders the company could seek permission to establish
its direct investment in one of the other member states. If establishment is
permitted by one of the other member states several consequences would follow.
Despite the French refusal, the U. S. company could gain the right to establish
itself in France by invoking the applicable establishment provisions of the Treaty
of Rome.9" Further, France would forfeit to the other member state, which
gave permission to the American company, the technology which this company
possesses, the tax revenues this company will pay, and the employment and
training of local laborers which this company will provide.9 Knowing these
consequences, France may feel compelled to grant permission for the establish-
ment of a foreign subsidiary even though such establishment would be contrary
to France's national economic policies.
As a result of these pressures, the American multinational corporation is in
a very favorable position. If it wishes to establish itself in a member state which
either refuses to give permission or does give permission but imposes harsh regu-
lations, it can threaten to establish itself elsewhere. The multinational corpo-
ration thereby forces the member state to choose between granting permission
for the direct investment, contrary to its national economic policy, or permitting
one of the other member states to reap the various incidental benefits associated
with foreign direct investment.
V. Right of Establishment and Foreign Investors
Under the E.E.C. Treaty
A. Introduction
The legal and administrative treatment of foreign enterprises in E.E.C.
97 See Part V infra and THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY IN THE 1970's 105 (S. Warnecke ed.
1972).
98 KRAUSE, supra note 6, at 146.
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countries is characterized by the initial establishment and exchange control regu-
lations imposed by the individual member states. The establishment and ex-
change control regulations of the United Kingdom and France have been dis-
cussed above. Once the foreign company has been granted permission to establish
itself by one of the member states, it must do so in conformity with the company
law of that member state. Upon completion of its establishment the new enter-
prise becomes entitled to treatment as a national of that member state under
Article 58 of the E.E.C. Treaty.9 Community law affords several advantages
in addition to those provided by the laws and economies of the individual mem-
ber states and by the expanding market of the E.E.C. Community law can
confer on foreign-owned enterprises the same rights and privileges enjoyed by
locally owned enterprises in the Common Market; namely, Community treat-
ment. This means that the company may set up anywhere within the E.E.C.
The E.E.C. Treaty states the conditions which must be fulfilled before a
foreign enterprise may claim to be entitled to Community treatment. In regard
to the right to establish agencies, branches, or subsidiaries in other member states
Articles 52-58 of the Treaty are controlling. The provisions of the Treaty con-
cerning the freedom of establishment, the freedom to move capital, goods, ser-
vices, and workers across national boundaries are part of the Community Law
under the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice."'
The European Court of Justice has jurisdiction only over those rights of
foreign investors which arise under Community Law. The Court of Justice
ensures uniform observance of the E.E.C. Treaty and of the rights of foreign
investors under provisions of the Treaty. If a member state violates the pro-
tected rights of a foreign investor, however, the aggrieved individuals or corpo-
rations cannot file a complaint against a member state with the European Court.
Article 169 permits the Commission to represent the interests of injured natural
or legal persons before the Court of Justice. Further, a member state which
believes that another member state has failed to fulfill its obligations under the
Treaty may also bring the matter before the Court of Justice as provided in
Article 170 of the E.E.C. Treaty. Consequently, only the Commission and a
member state can bring a complaint against another member state for a violation
of the rights guaranteed by the Treaty. A member state, therefore, which has
violated the right of establishment under Articles 52-58 of an American Com-
pany which has qualified for treatment as a national of a member state cannot
be so charged by the American company before the European Court of Justice.
The proper procedure for the American company is to bring this violation
to the attention of the Commission or to that member state in which the com-
pany is already established. The Commission or that other member state may
then bring the matter before the European Court of Justice. If, however, both
of these bodies sympathize with the member state which is in technical violation
of the Treaty, the American company will have no legal remedy available to
99 W. BALEKJIAN, LEGAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENTS IN THE EUROPEAN EcO-
NOMIC COMMUNITY 161 (1967).
100 The Treaty of Rome, art. 164, states that "the Court of Justice shall ensure that in the
interpretation and application of this Treaty the law is observed."
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it other than to pursue the matter in the courts of the member state that is
violating the Treaty.
B. The Right of Establishment
The initial entry of a foreign direct investment in a member state, the form
of direct investment selected, and the transfer and repatriation of capital are
governed by the regulations and laws of each member state. Community law is
irrelevant for these aspects of foreign direct investment, and will remain irrele-
vant until the nine member states can agree on a common commercial policy.
Once a foreign investor becomes "established" in one of the member states,
Community law does become relevant for that investor if he desires to establish
operations elsewhere within the Community. The right of establishment, in the
context of Community law, has been defined as: "the right of nationals and of
commercial or industrial legal entities assimilated to them, to move without legal
restrictions set up for economic reasons, from the territory of one member state
to that of another, for setting up or continuing a permanent commercial
activity."
10 1
The critical Treaty provision for a foreign enterprise wishing to satisfy the
nationality principle and claim the right of establishment is Article 58. This
article requires that companies or firms "formed in accordance with the laws
of a member state and having their registered office (statutory seat), central
administration (center of management), or principal place of business within
the Community" be treated as natural persons who are nationals of that
member state. This is important because Article 58 is written in terms of
"natural persons." The Treaty does not specify any requirements as to the
nationality or residence of the owners or directors of a company seeking the
right of establishment."0 2 Consequently, an American-owned subsidiary formed
in accordance with the requirements stipulated in Article 58 will be treated
as a national of the member state under whose laws it has been formed and will,
therefore, qualify for the right of establishment under Article 52.
Freedom of establishment, however, is not completely unrestricted. It
merely mandates that the host country treat nationals of other member states,
with regard to the right of establishment, the same- as it would treat its own
citizens. Article 52 of the E.E.C. Treaty requires that restrictions on the freedom
of establishment are to be abolished. The restrictions include "those on the
setting up of agencies, branches, or subsidiaries by nationals of any member
state established in the territory of any member state."'' Article 52 refers
specifically to nationals of any member state. Consequently, nationals of non-
member states, even those who are located in a member state, will not qualify
under Article 52.1"4
This requirement that only nationals of member states will be given the
101 BALEKJIAN, supra note 99, at 200.
102 Id. at 205.
103 See Treaty of Rome, art. 52(1).
104 A foreign investor established in one E.E.C. nation and desiring to extend business
operations into another E.E.C. nation must qualify under that host country's national law.
See BALEKJIAN, supra note 99, at 203 passim.
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benefit of Article 52 is the first of two proscriptions set out in Article 52. A
national of a non-member state who has a direct investment in one member
state will not be able to bring himself within the requirements of Article 52 unless
he has followed the establishment procedure outlined in Article 58 of the
Treaty. By complying with the procedure the national of a non-member state
will be accorded the status of a national of that member state in which it has
made the investment for purposes of the E.E.C. Treaty. He must, however, be
able to satisfy the second proscription contained in Article 52.
The second proscription in Article 52 is as follows. The phrase, "established
in the territory of any member state" implies that there must be an "economic
link" between the company claiming the right of establishment and the economy
of the member state in which it is first established." 5 If no such "economic
link" can be proven, then persons, whether nationals or non-nationals of a
member state, will not be entitled to claim the right of establishment under
Article 52. Any foreign investor who desires to claim the right of establishment
must satisfy both the nationality principle and the principle of an economic
link with a member state.
The term "economic link" has posed some confusion in the member states.
The economic link must be genuine.' Some of the member states recognize
a registered office as a genuine economic link, while several of the member states
do not recognize a company as being formed in accordance with their laws
unless it has a real office in the member state where the company is formed.'
The foreign investor must be careful to determine if the member state in which
the investment is being made requires that a genuine office be established, not
merely a registered office. Failure to comply with the municipal laws of the
member state may prevent the new company from qualifying under Article 52.
Finally, a company which has been incorporated in a member state and
has been established within the E.E.C. through a branch will qualify under
Article 52 to establish its head office or branch operations in other member states
only if it can bring itself within Article 58."0' If this same company, however,
incorporates a subsidiary in the E.E.C., and if the subsidiary has its principal
place of business or its center of management there, then the subsidiary, not the
parent company, will qualify for the right of establishment under Article 52.1"'
This distinction between a branch and a subsidiary must be remembered by an
American-owned company planning to make a direct investment in a member
state if it is considering using Article 52 to establish operations in other member
states.
Each member state still possesses full power and authority over foreign
direct investment originating in countries outside the E.E.C. It is generally
difficult, however, for a member state to prevent a foreign investor from escaping
the discriminatory regulations imposed by that member state on foreign investors.
105 J. LANG, THE COMMON MARKET AND COMMON LAW 147 (1966).
106 See The General Programme on the Suppression of Restrictions on the Freedom of
Establishment (Dec. 18, 1961).
107 LANG, supra note 105, at 152.
108 Id. at 154.
109 Id.
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If an American comparny is seeking establishment in France, for example, but
the French regulations are unduly restrictive, the American company can gain
access to France by bringing itself within the E.E.C. Treaty. The American
company should follow the procedures outlined above, (i.e., fulfill the require-
ments in Articles 52-58 of the Treaty), by availing itself of the more liberal
rules for non-resident establishment in one of the other member states. Once
it has done so, it can gain access to France through its new European office via
Article 52. France must, then, comply with the mandate of the Treaty and
treat the proposed direct investment in the same manner as it would treat the
same direct investment undertaken by any other national of a member state.
This unqualified right of establishment given by Article 52 is the general
rule. There are, however, exceptions. If France, in the above example, can
invoke one of these exceptions it will be able to deny the right of establishment
to the American-owned subsidiary which has fully complied with Article 58.
All that is necessary is that the French Government be able to prove the appli-
cability of one of the recognized exceptions to the European Commission.
The European Council may, acting on a proposal from the Commission,
rule that the Treaty provisions on the freedom of establishment should not apply
to certain activities.' Moreover, the law, regulation, or administrative action
of a member state may limit the freedom of establishment, only if the member
state convinces the Commission that such a limitation is essential to that member
state's welfare, on grounds of public policy, public security, or public health." 1
Additionally, there is a general provision which empowers the Commission to
authorize a member state to take protective action if freedom of establishment
would create serious difficulties "liable to persist in any sector of the economy or
which could bring about serious deterioration in the economic situation of a
given area.""2
C. Conclusion
The Treaty enables a company established in one member state of the
Community to establish itself in any other member state. This overrides any
national policies or laws, with the few exceptions stated above, which discrimi-
nate against companies owned by nationals of non-member states." 3 The
Treaty, however, does not prevent companies owned by nationals of non-member
states from being deprived of the right of establishment by a uniform law adopted
by all member states." 4 Indeed, France has been continually advocating the
adoption of a common commercial policy to restrict foreign direct investment
in European industry."' The adoption of such a policy, however, is not to be
expected in the near future. American companies, therefore, can use the E.E.C.
110 Treaty of Rome, art. 55.
111 Treaty of Rome, art. 56.
112 Treaty of Rome, art. 226.
113 LANG, supra note 105, at 150.
114 Id.
115 In 1963 France proposed to the Finance Ministers of the original six Member States at
the Baden-Baden conference that the Commission prepare a study of U.S. investment in the
E.E.C. for the purpose of laying the foundation for Community controls on U.S. investment.
This proposal was not followed by the Commission as it was believed that the matter of U.S.
investment should be handled on a national basis. See Dixcim, supra note 92, at 73.
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Treaty to circumvent discriminatory prohibitions against the establishment of
subsidiaries of American companies in a particular member state.
The benefit which Articles 52-58 can bestow on a company owned by na-
tionals of non-member states is apparently unknown to many American com-
panies.116 The companies which would probably benefit most from these pro-
visions are those companies which do not possess sufficiently great economic or
technological strength. These companies would be less successful in an attempt
to induce the host government to grant permission for their direct investment
on a non-discriminatory basis. Knowledge of the potential benefits which the
right of establishment provisions of the E.E.C. Treaty can confer on such com-
panies would be beneficial for any such company planning a direct investment
in the European Common Market.
VI. Conclusion
The U. S. company seeking to make a direct investment within the E.E.C.
must be aware of several factors which provide distinct advantages to the U. S.
company. The member states of the Common Market control foreign direct
investment on a national level due to the failure of the member states to formu-
late a common commercial policy. Each member state has instituted national
commercial policies which it believes will best promote the economic welfare
of its people. Consequently, the policies differ considerably. This divergence in
national commercial policies provide a U. S. multinational corporation with the
means through which it can gain an advantageous position within the Common
Market should a member state refuse to grant permission for the investment or
impose strict regulations on the investment. The U. S. multinational can use
its economic power and the threat of establishing its direct investment elsewhere
as leverage with which to gain favorable treatment from an otherwise reluctant
member state.
Should the use of the U. S. multinational corporation's economic power
and the threat of establishment elsewhere within the Common Market prove to
be ineffective in persuading the member state to relax its restrictions, or should
the U. S. company decide that it would be unwise to employ such a technique,
there exists an alternative for the U. S. company to follow. If the company
establishes its registered office, principal place of business, or its headquarters
in a member state and fully complies with the requirements of Article 58 of the
E.E.C. Treaty, it will be given the status of a national of that member state.
Once the U. S. subsidiary has acquired this national status it must also comply
with the second requirement contained in Article 52, namely: establish a genuine
economic link with a member state. Upon complying with these two require-
ments the U. S. subsidiary may invoke Article 52 of the E.E.C. Treaty and claim
the right to establish operations anywhere within the E.E.C.
Justin M. Stuhldreher
116 Many U.S. multinational Companies deal directly with the government of the country
in which they plan to invest. They have never relied on the Right of Establishment provisions
of the E.E.C. Treaty.. Should a company encounter discriminatory treatment from a country
or be denied permission to establish its investment, it could utilize the establishment provisions
of the Treaty, provided that it qualifies under article 58.
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